Corporate ownership and control in an emerging market: A review by Nakpodia, F
Journal of Governance and Regulation / Volume 9, Issue 3, 2020 
 
40 
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND 
CONTROL IN AN EMERGING MARKET:  
A REVIEW 
 
Franklin Nakpodia
 *
 
 
* Leeds University Business School, University of Leeds, Leeds, the UK 
Contact details: Leeds University Business School, Maurice Keyworth Building, University of Leeds, Leeds, LS2 9JT, the UK 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
How to cite this paper: Nakpodia, F. 
(2020). Corporate ownership and control in 
an emerging market: A review. Journal of 
Governance & Regulation, 9(3), 40-48. 
http://doi.org/10.22495/jgrv9i3art3 
 
Copyright © 2020 The Author 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative 
Commons Attribution 4.0 International 
License (CC BY 4.0). 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
4.0/  
 
ISSN Print: 2220-9352 
ISSN Online: 2306-6784 
 
Received: 21.06.2020 
Accepted: 30.07.2020 
 
JEL Classification: G32, G34, O16 
DOI: 10.22495/jgrv9i3art3 
 
The corporate ownership and control literature (Dai & Helfrich, 
2016; Aminadav & Papaioannou, 2016) has reported inconsistent 
findings in varieties of capitalism. The limited scholarship in 
developing economies has contributed to this problem, as much of 
the research in this field focus on developed economies. Thus, this 
paper primarily reviews the corporate ownership and control 
literature in Africa’s largest economy (Nigeria) and identifies future 
research directions. The article commences by undertaking an 
overview of corporations in Nigeria, followed by a discussion of 
corporate ownership in the country. The paper then assesses the 
market for corporate control in Nigeria, unpacking the major 
issues that frustrate the protection of minority shareholders’ rights 
in the country. The paper concludes by evaluating the relationship 
between corporate ownership and firm performance to promote a 
better understanding of the prevalence of concentrated ownership 
in the country’s corporate environment. In summary, this article 
recaps past works, integrates contemporary thoughts, and 
proposes new scholarly and contextual directions that researchers 
could explore to deepen the existing knowledge about corporate 
ownership and control. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The corporate ownership and control concept is an 
important area of deliberation in corporate literature 
(Dai & Helfrich, 2016; Nakpodia, 2019). Three 
primary reasons inform this attention. First, the 
concept offers an effective governance mechanism 
to discipline and minimise agency problems 
(Glendening, Khurana, & Wang, 2016; Stepanov & 
Suvorov, 2017). Second, there is considerable 
evidence (Kapopoulos & Lazaretou, 2007; Acheson, 
Campbell, Turner, & Vanteeva, 2016) uncovering how 
the concept impacts corporate organisations. Third, 
corporate ownership and control notion has sizeable 
implications for firm survival (Zeitun, 2009; Lakshan 
& Wijekoon, 2012). These contributions were 
motivated by Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means, in 
their 1932 classic titled The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property. In that piece, they highlight the 
attractiveness of dispersed ownership among US 
corporations, where firm ownership rests with 
shareholders, but corporate control is vested in the 
hands of managers. The suppositions in Berle and 
Means (1932) trigger ideas that facilitate greater 
understanding of the fundamentals of corporate 
ownership and control such as agency theory 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976), the separation of 
ownership from control (Fama & Jensen, 1983), 
managerial ownership (Zondi & Sibanda, 2015; 
Arowolo & Che-Ahmad, 2016), among others. 
Corporate ownership and control scholarship 
integrates two strands of literature – the 
determinants of corporate ownership (Aminadav & 
Papaioannou, 2016; Alnabsha, Abdou, Ntim, & 
Elamer, 2018), and the operation of the market for 
corporate control (Glendening, Khurana, & 
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Wang, 2016). Corporate ownership, on the one hand, 
embodies the creation of a legal entity that is 
detached from its owners, emphasising the 
involvement of any number of owners with the 
collective goal of converting businesses into 
corporations (Cheffins, 2010). On the other hand, 
corporate control implies the authority and ability to 
make strategic and operational decisions in 
corporations (Cheffins, 2010; Hedge & Mishra, 2017). 
Most of these decisions are a response to the failure 
of internal governance mechanisms, thus providing 
an incentive for potential acquirers to takeover, i.e., 
the market for corporate control. 
Corporate ownership and control react to a 
variety of factors, one of which is the institutional 
environment (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 
1999; Arslan & Alqatan, 2020). In certain contexts, 
institutional features contend with a myriad of 
challenges that often include weak legal systems, 
low corporate valuations, poorly developed, and 
illiquid stock markets (Nakpodia & Adegbite, 2018; 
Nakpodia, 2018). When corporations face these 
constraints in their domestic markets, a major 
outcome is that access to capital markets is 
restricted, thereby limiting the marketability of its 
equity to potential investors. Though these concerns 
are widespread in developing and emerging 
economies (Nakpodia & Adegbite, 2018), the 
literature (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 
1999; Alves, 2010) suggests that this development is 
critical to the interactions between corporate 
ownership and corporate control. To generate 
insights regarding the above, this paper adopts  
one of the largest economies in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
i.e., Nigeria. 
Relying on the institutional attributes of the 
Nigerian business environment (Adegbite & 
Nakajima, 2011), this paper addresses three specific 
objectives. First, the article reviews corporate 
ownership and control in Nigeria, highlighting how 
its practice in the country diverges from those of 
developed economies. Second, it evaluates the 
market for corporate control in the country, 
concentrating on factors that impede its 
performance and its effect on minority shareholder’s 
rights protection. Lastly, this article discusses the 
relationship between corporate ownership and 
performance among Nigerian firms. 
This review article addresses the above 
objectives by presenting an overview of corporations 
in Nigeria, paying attention to the categories of 
companies in the country. The paper then focuses 
on the dominant ownership structure among Nigeria 
corporations, followed by a discussion of the market 
for corporate control and the factors that impact its 
performance in the country. Next, the paper 
examines a critical variable in the market for 
corporate control, i.e., the protection of minority 
shareholder rights and identifies practices that 
frustrate this expectation. The article concludes by 
reviewing the relationship between corporate 
ownership and corporate performance and 
articulating areas for further research. 
 
2. OVERVIEW OF CORPORATIONS IN NIGERIA 
 
Like in most developing economies, the emergence 
and development of corporations in Nigeria benefit 
from the enactment of various corporate 
regulations. The origin of corporate law in Nigeria 
dates to 1874 (during the colonial era) with the 
adoption of the English company law in the country 
(Akinpelu, 2011) to support the operations of British 
firms. Subsequent developments in the Nigerian 
corporate horizon necessitated amendments to the 
company laws in 1912, 1922, 1954 and 1968. Yet, 
the failings of the Companies Act of 1968 oblige the 
promulgation of the current companies’ statute, i.e., 
the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 
in 1990. The introduction of CAMA strengthened 
existing company provisions, sanctioned the 
formation of the Corporate Affairs Commission 
(CAC), and provided stricter procedures for share 
capital issues (CAC, 1990, Parts V and VI). Regarding 
share capital, CAMA provided extensive updates to 
nature, issue, and allotment, as well as the transfer 
and forfeiture of shares. CAMA also established two 
crucial provisions that shaped the corporate 
landscape in the country. 
The first is the categorisation of corporations. 
Section 21 of CAMA created three types of 
companies in Nigeria, namely companies limited by 
shares, companies limited by guarantee, and 
unlimited companies. Companies limited by shares 
are companies where members’ liability is limited to 
the amount, if any, unpaid on the shares held by 
them. In other words, the liability of shareholders is 
limited to their shareholding in the event of 
liquidation. Depending on local institutional 
characteristics, corporate ownership in this form of 
companies is either concentrated or dispersed. The 
next type of company is those limited by guarantee. 
These companies, according to CAMA, shall not be 
registered with a share capital, and are prohibited 
from pursuing profit. They are primarily non-profit 
organisations that desire legal personality. The last 
category of companies is incorporated companies 
that have no limit on the liability of its members. 
CAMA notes that these three forms of companies 
can be either a private company or a public 
company. The public companies are listed on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE). As of March 2020, 
there are 359 listed companies on the NSE with a 
market capitalisation of USD$66.2billion (NSE, 2020). 
The second notable element in CAMA is the 
introduction of practices that resonate with good 
corporate governance. Before the introduction of 
CAMA, there was no corporate governance 
regulation. However, Ogbuozobe (2009) admits that 
CAMA provided the foundation for corporate 
governance in Nigeria, in view of the corporate 
principles it established, such as accountability, 
equality, transparency, independence, among others. 
These provisions are broadly consistent with the 
main principles (e.g., leadership, effectiveness, 
accountability, relationship with stakeholders) that 
embed reputable corporate governance regulations 
such as the UK Code of Corporate Governance  
(FRC, 2018), OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance (OECD, 2015), among others. Dembo 
and Rasaratnam (2014) note that the provisions in 
CAMA were the building blocks for enacting the first 
corporate governance regulation in Nigeria, i.e., the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Code of 
Corporate Governance (SEC, 2003).  
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3. OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES OF COMPANIES IN 
NIGERIA 
 
To extend the evaluation of corporations in Nigeria, 
it is necessary to examine the dominant corporate 
ownership structures in the country. Given the 
variation in corporate ownership models, a review of 
corporate ownership in Nigeria demands an 
assessment of critical influences on corporate 
ownership. The growing literature exploring the 
determinants of corporate ownership is a reaction to 
Berle and Means’ (1932) proposition, suggesting that 
corporate law reforms in the US in the 1930s 
account for the separation of ownership and control 
in its corporations. Demsetz and Lehn (1985), for 
example, contend that variations in corporate 
ownership are consistent with three factors, i.e., the 
value-maximising size of firms, the profit potential 
from exercising more effective control (control 
potential), and systematic regulation (aimed at 
imposing constraints on shareholder decisions). 
Whereas Demsetz and Lehn (1985) investigated US 
firms, a broader study by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Shleifer (1999) revealed a more concentrated 
corporate ownership system, influenced by 
shareholder protection regulations. A common 
theme in Demsetz and Lehn (1985), La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) is the role of 
corporate regulation in individual countries. CAC 
(1990) provides the regulatory spine for untangling 
corporate ownership in Nigeria. 
The discussion of ownership structure among 
Nigerian companies draws from a dual perspective, 
i.e., forms of corporate ownership, and 
concentration of ownership. The types of corporate 
ownership in Nigeria links to the categories of 
companies prescribed in CAMA. Limited companies, 
unlimited companies, and companies limited by 
guarantee may be owned by investors (a group of 
individuals) or the government. Ownership by a 
group of individuals is widespread in limited 
companies (investors) and companies limited by 
guarantee. Government participation in corporate 
ownership is observed in cases of a failing company, 
which if allowed to fail, may have severe 
consequences for a broader spectrum of 
stakeholders. This ownership intervention is 
prevalent in the country’s banking sector. The 
government may also assume corporate ownership 
when it establishes an organisation that provides 
essential services.  
As the Nigerian economy is largely  
public-sector driven, the government actively 
participates in the provision of services to the 
populace. Besides investors and government 
ownership of corporations, CAC (1990, Chapter 3) 
also provides for foreign ownership of companies in 
Nigeria, allowing foreigners either to float a 
company or to acquire a majority stakeholding in 
existing corporations. These forms of corporate 
ownership are not only fundamental to the 
concentration of ownership among Nigerian 
companies but also impact the market for corporate 
control. This is because the contribution of minority 
shareholders is typically overlooked, as decisions 
concerning the acquisition and disposal of 
companies remain the exclusive preserve of large 
and concentrated equity holders. 
Ahunwan (2002) and Adegbite (2015) categorise 
ownership of Nigerian firms into four groups. These 
are companies that are wholly owned by the 
government, joint venture arrangements between 
the government and foreign crude  
oil-producing companies, publicly listed companies, 
and unlisted privately-owned firms. Apart from 
publicly listed companies, the concentrated 
ownership model is prevalent in the three other 
categorisations of corporate ownership in the 
country. Tsegba, Herbert, and Ene (2014) note that 
concentrated ownership is rife among listed public 
firms in Nigeria. Therefore, in agreement with 
Ahunwan (2002), concentrated ownership is the 
dominant model of ownership in Nigerian 
corporations. This is unsurprising, as La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) have 
suggested that countries with a poor record of 
shareholder protection (e.g., Nigeria) tend to exhibit 
a concentrated corporate ownership profile, that 
tolerates the exploitation of minority shareholders. 
However, this model of corporate ownership, 
considering the inattention to minority shareholders, 
unearths significant agency concerns (Aminadav & 
Papaioannou, 2016). Such agency concerns trigger 
activity in the market for corporate control. 
 
4. THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL IN 
NIGERIA 
 
The market for corporate control (or the takeover 
market) allows alternative managerial teams to 
compete for the right to manage corporate 
resources. In doing so, it reconciles strategic  
risk-taking and value creation by providing 
opportunities that alleviate excess risk avoidance, as 
risk-taking bidders’ takeover conservative targets 
and redeploy their assets to more productive 
projects (Hegde & Mishra, 2017). Martynova and 
Renneboog (2011), however, noted that the 
outcomes of corporate takeovers are affected by 
large shareholders in the acquiring firm, weak 
investor protection, and low disclosure concerns. 
These concerns have been widely reported in 
developing economies such as Nigeria (Nakpodia, 
Adegbite, Amaeshi, & Owolabi, 2018). 
The market for corporate control in Nigeria 
responds to the dominant forms of corporate 
control in the country. Caswell (1987) articulates 
dual avenues of corporate control, i.e., direct control 
through stockholding, and network control exercised 
through the interlocking board of directors. These 
categorisations substantially reflect the market for 
corporate control in Nigeria. Concerning the first 
category, the market for corporate control in Nigeria 
is limited by its capital markets (Adegbite & 
Nakajima, 2011) because it is weak at developing 
aspects of the market such as an active M&A market, 
minimising hostile takeovers, and promoting equal 
treatment of shareholders. Accordingly, Okike 
(2007) notes that the Nigerian Stock Exchange  
has traditionally persisted as a non-stock  
exchange-based financial system. This implies that 
Nigerian firms do not perceive the stock exchange as 
a vehicle for raising new capital, thus impeding the 
role of the stock market in strengthening the market 
for corporate control. The inability of the stock 
exchange to drive the market for corporate control 
derives from the illiquidity of the market, low 
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capitalisation (that may not support deals that 
require significant fund outlay), as well as the weak 
information architecture of the market. 
These preceding concerns explain the narrow 
M&A activity in Nigeria, with most of the M&A deals 
in the country consummated in the banking 
industry. Because of the various governance failures 
in the banking system (Nworji, Olagunju, & 
Adeyanju, 2011), the industry regulators 
implemented a consolidation policy. This 
intervention offered opportunities for the takeover 
of underperforming and undervalued companies, 
triggering many M&As in the sector (Wigwe, 2012). 
These M&As are consistent with the first category in 
Caswell (1987), as acquirers sought to gain control in 
target firms by directly buying shares. Though this 
development culminated in a northward surge in the 
market share of acquirers (Adedeji, Babatunde, & 
Adekanye, 2015), it limited the fierce competitive 
rivalry that has been the hallmark of the industry.  
Following the consolidation programme in the 
banking industry, scholars have examined the effect 
of M&A on the performance of banks. Elumilade 
(2010) reports that M&As, compelled by the 
consolidation agenda in the banking sector, 
improved competitiveness and efficiency of the 
borrowing and lending functions of Nigerian banks. 
Similarly, Olagunju and Obademi (2012), using 
published audited accounts of 42% of the banks that 
emerged from the consolidation programme, 
conclude that M&As improved the performance of 
Nigerian banks. This outcome, they claim, is 
evidenced by the attendant growth in the real sector. 
Anderibom and Obute (2015) add that M&As had 
positive, significant effects on the Nigerian bank’s 
performance. However, Ebimobowei and Sophia 
(2011) suggested otherwise, concluding that M&As 
among Nigerian banks did not achieve the desired 
liquidity, capital adequacy, and corporate 
governance objectives. To this end, they 
(Ebimobowei & Sophia, 2011) contend that the 
system remains exposed to wide-ranging corruption 
and insider abuses. The results in Ebimobowei and 
Sophia’s (2011) study are consistent with prior 
findings in Somoye’s (2008) which clarifies that the 
consolidation agenda has not improved the overall 
performances of banks significantly. While the time 
differences in Ebimobowei and Sophia (2011), 
Anderibom and Obute (2015) may inform the 
inconsistent findings, both studies employed similar 
variables, i.e., capital, liquidity, and management. 
The scant literature in this area hampers a broader 
assessment of the variations in results. Therefore, 
further research is necessary to establish a better 
understanding of the impact of M&As on the 
banking industry. 
In addition to M&As, markets for corporate 
control responds to shareholder activism. Letsou 
(1992) observes that the regulation of publicly listed 
firms provides shareholders with limited powers, 
evident in their inability to control corporate 
decisions. Despite the contentions that shareholder 
activism is a force for good corporate governance, 
Adegbite, Amaeshi, and Amao (2012) argue that 
shareholder activism in Nigeria reflects the country’s 
brand of politics, hence the unethical politicking 
among shareholders. This argument fits with 
Caswell’s (1987) second conception of the market 
for corporate control as a form of network control 
exercised by ‘connected’ board of directors. The 
political affiliation of principal shareholders tends 
to undermine the ‘voice’ mechanism during 
corporate engagements, with substantial 
implications for agentic relationships. Besides,  
Uche, Adegbite, and Jones (2016) claim that the 
presence of passive institutional shareholders 
inhibits shareholder activism in Nigeria. This not 
only tolerates a non-dialectical approach to 
accountability by institutional shareholders but also 
starves minority shareholders of the crucial support 
needed to influence corporate decisions. The 
resulting passiveness of institutional shareholders 
limits the potential of the market for corporate 
control as organisations adopt a conservative stance 
to risk-taking. Besides, it affects the wealth 
maximisation objectives of small investors. 
In addition to M&As and shareholder activism, 
it is imperative to note that the market for corporate 
control in Nigeria suffers from the stifling effect of  
a government-driven economy. In many parts of the 
world, especially in the West, market forces dictate 
the role of the market for corporate control. 
However, in markets where the government is  
a major player in corporate ownership and control, 
the usefulness of the takeover market as a value 
creation instrument is destabilised. In Nigeria, and 
many developing and emerging economies, the 
government is actively involved in the strategic 
decisions of corporations. These decisions include 
M&As, corporate reorganisation, and reforms.  
The economic behaviour of stakeholders prompts 
the operations of the takeover market, but when  
the government can influence the economic conduct  
and actions of stakeholders, the relevance of the 
takeover market becomes debatable. The passivity  
of institutional shareholders and the role of 
government as regards the takeover market combine 
to accentuate the challenges that minority 
shareholders encounter in the Nigerian corporate 
landscape. 
 
5. MINORITY SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROTECTION 
IN NIGERIA 
 
The protection of shareholder rights is not only an 
essential characteristic for controlling the behaviour 
and actions of corporate boards, but it also 
represents a principal driver of good corporate 
governance (Kirkbride, Letza, & Smallman, 2009; 
Safiullah, 2016). Indeed, agency theorising has been 
broadened to acknowledge the principal-principal 
conundrum which not only investigates the conflict 
between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders (Li & Qian, 2013) but also exposes the 
neglect of minority shareholders in the corporate 
scholarship (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 
2008). However, in the shareholder rights protection 
literature, there is an increased emphasis on 
minority shareholders. Aduma and Ibekwe (2017) 
inform that the protection of minority shareholders 
is one of the most difficult challenges facing modern 
corporations. Following this, corporate governance 
regulations across the globe have stressed the need 
to pay more attention to the rights of minority 
shareholders. These are evident in corporate 
regulation provisions such as voting rights, right to 
the first refusal, share transfer restrictions, and 
rights of the first offer. For example, section 22.3 of 
the SEC (2011) states that it is the responsibility of 
corporate boards to ensure that minority 
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shareholders are treated fairly and protected from 
abusive and exploitative actions of controlling 
shareholders.  
Despite the regulatory guidelines, it is not 
uncommon to find majority shareholders engaging 
in actions that are not only oppressive but also 
contradictory to the interests of minority 
shareholders. Aduma and Ibekwe (2017) state that 
minority shareholders’ protection in Nigeria suffers 
from the system of voting used in electing directors. 
They explained that the voting system makes it 
impracticable for minority shareholders to elect 
their representatives. The voting procedure, for 
instance, is designed to restrict the physical 
attendance of minority shareholders or their 
nominated proxies. There have been cases where 
AGMs take place in remote locations that are 
difficult to access by minority shareholders, whereas 
the majority of shareholders are incentivised to 
attend such meetings. Unfortunately, the capacity of 
minority equity holders to resist such practices is 
weak. Li and Qian (2013) explain that in regions with 
more institutional development, minority 
shareholders’ rights are not only better protected, 
but they are also able to put up a robust resistance 
to takeover attempts that conflict with their wealth 
maximisation goals. 
Institutional context and the degree of 
ownership concentration also characterise  
the extent to which the rights of minority 
shareholders are protected. Using a sample of large 
firms from 14 European markets, Kim,  
Kitsabunnarat-Chatjuthamard, and Nofsinger (2007) 
find that in countries where the protection of 
shareholder rights is more robust, the concentration 
of ownership is typically lower. While this supports 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1998), the reasoning here is that more dispersed 
ownership minimises the incidence of controlling 
shareholders. Earlier in this article, it was noted that 
concentrated ownership dominates the Nigerian 
corporate space, enabling the emergence of a class 
of shareholders whose corporate preferences and 
goals must eclipse those of other shareholding class, 
i.e., minority shareholders. 
Okpara (2010) adds that the lack of minority 
shareholder rights protection hampers corporate 
governance in the country, as the provision of 
section 22.3 of the SEC (2011) is contravened 
frequently. These problems, often linked to weak 
shareholder activism, are examined using two 
constructs. The first strand of challenges relates to 
those directly triggered by the minority 
shareholders. In this instance, Ahunwan (2002) 
observed that the naivety of minority shareholders 
neutralises the possibility or potency of activism, 
thereby permitting controlling shareholders to 
pursue interests that are incongruous with those of 
minority shareholders. Okpara (2010) also notes that 
ignorance of shareholder rights and privileges 
undermines the ability of minority equity holders to 
maximise their wealth. Besides, Bello (2016) informs 
that poor attendance at AGMs by minority 
shareholders have stifled their ‘voices’, allowing 
majority shareholders to maximise their influence 
over corporate decisions. 
The second construct of challenges confronting 
minority shareholders (in Nigeria) is those incited by 
the institutional characteristics (Li & Qian, 2013; 
Arslan & Alqatan, 2020). Concerning AGMs, Oyebode 
(2009) explained that AGMs in Nigeria are perceived 
as a jamboree rather than an opportunity for 
stewardship where shareholders examine the 
performance of boards and management. This 
perception reinforces the apathy of minority 
shareholders towards such opportunities for 
stewardship. This ‘opening’ provides majority 
shareholders with access to relevant corporate 
information that is manipulated to enable them to 
maximise their wealth at the expense of the 
information-deficient minority shareholders 
(Adegbite & Nakajima, 2011). The weak regulatory 
system also allows tunnelling as the majority 
shareholders collude among themselves and with 
their management to expropriate minority 
shareholders’ benefits (Okpara, 2010).  
 
6. CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND COMPANY 
PERFORMANCE 
 
Despite calls for the protection of minority equity 
holders’ rights, the literature is yet to demonstrate 
empirically how they affect corporate performance. 
Given this lacuna, this section employs corporate 
ownership, to comprehend how it links with 
corporate performance. The corporate ownership 
structure is an important variable that affects the 
health of corporations (Zeitun & Tian, 2007; 
Alnabsha, Abdou, Ntim, & Elamer, 2018). If the 
preceding holds, then the ownership structure of a 
firm can be investigated as a predictor of corporate 
performance. This view has been adopted widely in 
the existing literature. Whereas the literature has 
produced an inconsistent stream of results 
regarding the relationship between corporate 
ownership and corporate performance, most studies 
examining the relationship in emerging and 
developing economies have reported a positive 
relationship between both concepts. For instance, 
Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007), Mandaci and 
Gumus (2010), Maquieira, Espinosa, and Vieito 
(2011), Manawaduge and De Zoysa (2013), and 
Kandil and Markovski (2017) show that corporate 
ownership structure positively impacts corporate 
performance in Greece, Turkey, Chile, Sri Lanka, and 
the UAE respectively.  
An overarching conclusion emerging from 
previous studies is that a higher concentration of 
ownership leads to better corporate performance. 
This finding opposes the position in Berle and 
Means (1932) which identifies a more dispersed 
corporate ownership structure among US companies. 
While Dai and Helfrich (2016) observe that in 
contemporary capital markets, over 70% of the top 
500 US companies are held by institutional 
investors, they note that retail ownership still 
constitutes a substantial investor base in the US 
capital markets. Similar trends exist in the UK. 
Abdullah and Page (2009) affirm that there is no 
relationship between governance variables (which 
includes equity ownership and extent of ownership 
by large block holders) and corporate performance 
among UK companies. Most of the research 
(Craswell, Taylor, & Saywell, 1997; Iannotta, Nocera, 
& Sironi, 2007) investigating the connection between 
corporate ownership and firm performance in 
developed economies exposes the absence of any 
relationship or a negative relationship. It is 
important to note that many of these countries 
adopt a dispersed corporate ownership model. 
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Reyna, Vázquez, and Valdés (2012) suggest that 
the inconsistent result between developing and 
developed economies derives from the institutional 
structure prevailing in specific countries. Aguilera, 
Kabbach-Castro, Lee, and You (2012) allude to the 
subject of institutional variation, noting that while 
the concentration of corporate shareholdings 
remains a common denominator among the 
emerging countries investigated, the processes and 
structures governing firms in these countries is 
remarkably different. These cross-national variations 
in institutional environments (Nakpodia, Adegbite, 
Amaeshi, & Owolabi, 2018) hinder the consistency of 
corporate governance results, especially in countries 
with weak corporate regulation and ineffective 
institutions like Nigeria. 
In Nigeria, there is limited scholarship exploring 
the link between corporate ownership and company 
performance, but findings in many of this scholarship 
corroborate the literature (Maquieira, Espinosa, & 
Vieito, 2011; Manawaduge & De Zoysa, 2013; Kandil & 
Markovski, 2017) that investigates the relationship 
among other developing economies. Ahunwan (2002) 
notes that ownership in Nigerian corporations is 
highly concentrated. Okafor, Ugwuegbe, and Ezeaku 
(2016) show that ownership concentration produces a 
positive effect on corporate performance metrics, 
recommending that concentrated owners should 
continually increase their interest. Ozili and Uadiale 
(2017) investigated banks and reported that banks 
with high concentrated ownership generate a higher 
return on assets, higher net interest margin, and 
higher recurring earning power. These results link 
with practices in communitarian societies such as 
Germany and Japan. However, Nigeria adopts the 
Anglo-American model, which encourages a dispersed 
ownership structure, in its corporate regulation. 
Okpara (2010) argues that the incidence of 
concentrated ownership in Nigeria is instigated by a 
regulatory framework that allows individuals to 
acquire shares via proxies without proper verification. 
Furthermore, the business environment is mostly 
informal, thereby facilitating a high rate of family 
ownership that reinforces concentrated ownership. 
These concerns have considerable implications for the 
market for corporate control in Nigeria. 
 
7. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND AREAS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
The discussion in this review article suggests that 
the opportunities inherent in deploying corporate 
ownership and control mechanisms to enhance 
corporate performance are yet to be harnessed by 
Nigerian corporations. While arguments and cases 
have been put forward that explain the dominance 
of concentrated ownership, it is apparent that the 
system has denied itself the benefits inherent in 
protecting the rights of minority shareholders. This 
stifles the prospects of a sound corporate 
governance system and denies the country a 
substantial inflow of foreign investment especially 
as Khanna and Zyla (2012) note that foreign 
investors often do not invest in emerging markets 
with weak corporate governance structures.  
The largely inactive market for corporate 
control in Nigeria is another consequence of poor 
corporate governance practice. This is because  
anti-takeover defences such as poison pill, golden 
parachutes, and supermajority amendments 
(Ambrose & Megginson, 1992; Stout, 2002) are shut 
down by the presence of large block-holders. The 
informal nature of the capital market also 
undermines the market for corporate control in  
the country. The market tends to lack the discipline 
and mettle to implement corporate governance 
provisions. It is therefore imperative that 
irrespective of the reported positive relationship 
between corporate ownership and corporate 
performance among Nigerian corporations, scholars, 
and practitioners must continue to seek ways to 
protect the rights of minority shareholders in 
corporate decision-making.  
In addressing the above, it is essential to identify 
concerns that should provoke further research.  
The main thrust of the agency theory is the 
minimisation of agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Scholars (Stepanov & Suvorov, 2017; Bebchuk, 
Cohen, & Hirst, 2017) indicate that concentrated 
ownership minimises agency costs. While this 
suggests that the protection of minority shareholders’ 
rights is of little importance to agency cost, such a 
position could be hypothesised as minority 
shareholders’ irrelevance proposition. However,  
an essential concern in this hypothesis is that the 
literature has paid scant attention to how the 
protection of the rights of minority equity holders, 
especially in developing and emerging markets, 
relates to agency cost. Therefore, this article calls on 
scholars to investigate the value and contribution of 
minority shareholders to corporate variables such as 
agency and performance. In doing this, scholars 
should initiate research that isolates the role of 
corporate governance but focus on minority 
shareholders as an independent variable to study its 
contribution to organisational performance. This 
should unpack the ambiguity regarding the influence 
of minority shareholders, as well as deepen the 
understanding of the drivers of concentrated and 
dispersed corporate ownership models.  
This review also indicates that the market for 
control is less effective when the government or  
the state dominates corporate ownership. This 
concern is more pronounced in countries dogged by 
weak institutions. Thus, in this case, scholars are 
invited to initially identify the nexus between 
government ownership of corporations and the 
takeover market. The objective here should be to 
understand the nature of the relationship between 
both concepts. Next, scholars may also seek to 
extend this investigation by examining the 
motivations for government ownership of 
companies in varieties of capitalism to help generate 
insights that reveal how specific motivations affect 
the operationalisation of the takeover market taking 
into account the institutional variations in the 
countries under investigation.  
Finally, it is necessary to state that this review 
article suffers from a significant limitation.  
Whereas the context of this review is Nigeria, the 
scarcity of relevant academic and practice literature 
exploring corporate ownership and control in 
Nigeria and even in Africa meant that this article 
relied on insights from studies targeted at other 
contextual environments. It is anticipated that this 
article would provoke the emergence of a substantial 
volume of literature that investigates corporate 
ownership and control concerns in emerging and 
developing markets. 
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